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Terrorism and the Market State
Philip Bobbitt
I.
In the past decade, there has been an increasing recognition that
we are entering the transition from one constitutional order to
another.1 A constitutional order may be described by the unique claim it
makes on legitimate power. Thus, the order of princely states, which
flourished in the 16th century, demanded power on the basis of the
legitimacy of the princes with whom it was associated. Give us power,
the state said, and we will better protect the person and the posses-
sions of the prince. The constitutional order within which most states
have lived for most of the 20th century can also be characterized in a
unique way. Nation-states, that is, states that exist to serve national
groups, asked for legitimacy on the basis of a characteristic claim. Give
us power, the state said, and we will improve your material well-
being. The record of economic and material progress during the 20th
century amply justified this claim. So why, then, is this highly success-
ful order about to be replaced?
There are many reasons. I will give five. First, nation-states are find-
ing it increasingly difficult to protect, much less improve, the cohesion
and influence of national cultures, as these are strained by immigration
(without which the demographically challenged developed world can-
not sustain its material well-being), and by the electronic penetration
of every society so that nation-states cannot manage their cultural
lives. As an illustration, sixty percent of educated Chinese get their
news from abroad, despite strenuous efforts on the part of the govern-
ment to block these channels.
Second, nation-states are unable to govern the value of their
national currency, owing to a global system of trade and finance from
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which no state can withdraw without plunging itself into falling living
standards. The commodification of money in finance must rank with
the relativity of time in physics as one of the great breakthroughs of
the century. What were hitherto merely fixed measurements suddenly
became varying objects of value themselves. But the consequence of
this was to remove the control over national currencies from states and
give it to the pitiless international market.
Third, nation-states cannot determine the laws to be applied within
their states because these are being superseded by an international sys-
tem of human rights. For example, the reason Milosevic is in the dock
today is not because he failed to obey the laws of Serbia or because he
was not democratically elected by the Serbian nation. Rather, he ran
afoul of a set of norms, some not codified, which Serbian national insti-
tutions had not endorsed or given him authority to defy.
Fourth, nation-states face transnational threats (like AIDS and now
SARS) as well as climate changes (like global warming) that no state
can either hide from or successfully resolve on its own. It is hard not to
expect that sometime in the early 21st century, a mutated, drug-resis-
tant strain of influenza will strike the human population with a terrible
ferocity, quickened by international travel and urbanization. All the
finger pointing among nation-states after the collapse of the Kyoto
agreement only emphasizes how poor this kind of state is at coping
with transnational problems. It is hard to know whom to blame more:
those states that insisted on industrial reforms they knew were un-
achievable, or those states—like our own—that denounced the agree-
ment and then proposed nothing of substance to solve the problem.
The fifth reason is the development of weapons (like biological or
nuclear warheads) and delivery systems (like ballistic missiles) that
can radically shift the balance between offense and defense, because no
nation-state can protect itself by simply fortifying its national borders
or increasing the size of its army. The United States now has about a
million and a half men under arms. Its defense budget is larger than
that of the next fourteen countries combined, and will, by 2006, be
larger than the total aggregate of all the other defense budgets in the
world. Yet we are probably in greater danger today — and will be in
increasingly greater danger tomorrow — than we have been at any
time in the past century. For a state that claims power on the basis of
our steadily improving material well-being, this is not an encouraging
development.
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How did all this happen? These developments occurred, ironically,
as a consequence of the greatest success of the society of nation-states:
the end of the Long War of the 20th century and the triumph of mar-
ket-based democracies over competing forms of the nation-state —
communism and fascism. What defeated our competitors and discred-
ited their systems? It was our success in building an international 
system of trade and finance; winning acknowledgment of human
rights norms; bringing rapid industrial development to virtually every
northern tier (and many southern tier) states; achieving higher living
standards and reproductive control; creating international communi-
cations; and inventing and deploying weapons of mass destruction.
The very tactics, technologies, and strategies that brought us success in
war have now brought us new challenges, challenges that cannot be
met by the currently prevailing constitutional order.
II.
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the decay of the
nation-state as a constitutional order means the withering away of the
state itself. This conclusion is a tempting one if you believe, as many
do, that the development of the nation-state is synonymous with the
development of the state, and that the nation-state originated in the
Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and has been with us ever since. But if one
recognizes that several constitutional orders have existed since West-
phalia (and at least one before), then it is not hard to imagine that the
state will, as in past eras, undergo reform in order to accommodate
changed circumstances.
I have speculated elsewhere2 that the new constitutional order will
resemble that of the 21st-century multinational corporation rather than
the 20th-century state in that it will outsource many functions to the
private sector, rely less on law and regulation and more on market
incentives, and respond to ever-changing consumer demand rather
than to voter preferences expressed in relatively rare elections. This
new constitutional order, which I have called the “market state,” has
not arrived, but one can already see evidence of its approach.
When states move from raising armies by conscription to all-volun-
teer forces; when they introduce vouchers into the allocation of educa-
tional funds; when they deregulate not only vast areas of enterprise by
repealing industrial statutes but also deregulate the reproduction of
our species by striking down anti-abortion and anti-contraception
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laws; when states replace relatively generous unemployment compen-
sation with retraining programs designed to prepare the unemployed
for re-entry into the labor market; and when states permit their offi-
cials to be removed through ad hoc recall votes, and their laws to be
replaced by voter initiatives and referenda — when all of these devel-
opments occur, then we are witnessing the characteristics of the
emerging market state.
This transition will occur over many decades, and there are many
varying forms that the market state might take. If the past is any guide,
the transition will not be complete without violent conflict. In the past,
decades-long epochal wars brought about these transitions. It may be
that the war on terrorism is the first engagement of this new conflict.
III.
In the decade following the end of the Long War, three interesting
assessments were offered to give shape to the years that would follow.
The first theory arose from the fact that there now appeared to be a
consensus among the Great Powers, those states that had kept the
Long War going for seventy-five years, over just such a lack of consen-
sus. These states now agreed that parliamentary systems of consent,
market-based economies, and human rights grounded in the rule of
law were indispensable elements of a legitimate government. This the-
ory, memorably embodied in the phrase “The End of History,”3 held
that the dynamic of historical change had now reached a plateau with
stasis as far as the eye could see.
A second theory also arose from the apparent Great Power consen-
sus, but drew the opposite conclusion. Now that the ideological battles
of the Long War had ended and the adversaries appeared to have
achieved a political and strategic consensus, we could expect future
conflicts, not arising from ideological strife but along the great geopo-
litical seams of regional culture. “The Clash of Civilizations”4 awaited
us at the junctures where Western, Muslim, Slavic-Orthodox, Indian,
Chinese, and Japanese civilizations abraded each other.
A third theory did not treat the strategic, political, or cultural but
rather the economic elements of the life of states. In the 21st century,
we could look forward to a “virtuous circle of globalization.” As states
opened themselves to trade and international commerce, they would
become more prosperous; greater prosperity would bring a freer trade
in ideas, which would move countries toward greater democracy;
Macalester International Vol. 14
62
greater democracy would lead to an enhanced role for women, whose
fertility would decline, easing population pressures; and stable popu-
lations would lead to greater education, which, in turn, would lead to
greater competitiveness that would bring still greater prosperity.5 No
two states with a McDonalds restaurant, so the story went, had ever
gone to war with each other.
These popular theories have been widely discussed and I do not
intend to materially add to that discussion. Events since their publica-
tion have not been altogether supportive. If history ended with Ger-
man unification and the end of the Cold War, it began again with a
fury three years later in the Balkans. While we were watching the hor-
rors of a clash of civilizations in Israel and on September 11, India and
Pakistan, North and South Korea, and Iraq and her neighbors threat-
ened to go to war. In other words, profoundly worrying conflicts
seemed to arise within the great regional civilizations. Nor did it
escape the attention of journalists that there was a McDonalds just
down the street from some of the buildings shelled by NATO in Bel-
grade.
In fact, however, each of these theories held a good deal of truth.
Fukuyama correctly viewed the demise of the Cold War as the end of a
long century of ideological conflict that would enshrine a particular
form of the nation-state in every Great Power. Huntington wisely
appreciated that the end of the Long War did not mean the end of war,
and Friedman insightfully drew attention to the political and strategic
consequences, rather than causes, of globalization.6 But their impor-
tance, I think, lies not so much in what they drew attention to as in the
mere fact that these were the subjects — warfare, culture, and global-
ization — to which they drew attention. Each of these subjects was a
key to the coming of the market state and its relationship to terrorism,
even though not one of these theories seems capable of accurately
describing that relationship. Three unforeseen developments arose
from these three subjects, respectively, and they will be sufficient to
largely undo the postwar consensus among nation-states, to say noth-
ing of stalling globalization and calling into question the very division
of the world into geographical (rather than global) conflict.
IV.
The first of these unforeseen developments was the commodification
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). There arose a clandestine
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market in these weapons, which grew ever cheaper. States no longer
had to be rich to develop WMD and thus did not need to be Great
Powers, rendering the Great Power consensus less significant. Indeed,
it was no longer necessary for a state to develop its own nuclear or bio-
logical weapons at all — which might require years of sophisticated
technological and scientific effort—or to leave evidence of such devel-
opment for U.N. inspectors to detect. It will soon be possible for WMD
to be bought in the marketplace. A lucrative trade may already exist
between North Korea, which supplies ballistic missile technology;
Pakistan, which supplies fissionable material; and Iran, which needs
both and will soon be able to supply both to others.
The main reason for seeking a regime change in Baghdad was not,
in my opinion, because Iraq had certain weapons of mass destruction
(although I have no doubt that they did), but rather to keep it from get-
ting specifically nuclear weapons. The fact that the U.N. inspectors did
not find such weapons, from this point of view, is heartening rather
than, as the war’s detractors would have, damning to the Bush and
Blair administrations. One has to wonder at the logic of demonstrators
who, while professing a horror of nuclear proliferation, marched in
favor of keeping Saddam Hussein in power. Yet the logic of those who
would have waited to strike until such weapons were in Iraq’s posses-
sion (even assuming that the U.N. could have detected them, as they
did not in North Korea during the same period) is equally baffling.
The second unforeseen development was the emergence of a global
terrorist network that in many respects more closely resembles the
multinational corporation than it does a government. I draw attention
to this resemblance for an important reason: only if this structure is
appreciated can we connect the changes in terrorism (which many
commentators, especially in Europe, are at pains to deny) with the
changes in the constitutional order of the state.
In many respects, Al-Qaida is a kind of state. Like other states, it has
a standing army; it has a treasury and a consistent source of revenue; it
has a permanent civil service; it has an intelligence collection and
analysis cadre; it even runs a rudimentary welfare program for its
fighters and their relatives and associates. Furthermore, it has a recog-
nizable hierarchy of officials; it makes alliances with other states; it
promulgates laws, which it enforces ruthlessly; and it declares war.
But unlike the terrorist groups with which we are familiar, Al-Qaida
does not mimic the nation-state. The IRA, ETA, and PLO are all orga-
nized as tiny parodies of the hierarchical, militarized, ideologized
Macalester International Vol. 14
64
nation-state. This is hardly surprising as each is engaged in a struggle
for national liberation. By contrast, the multinational mercenary terror
network that Osama bin Laden and others have assembled is a new
and mutated version of the market state. It resembles the organiza-
tional structure of VISA or MasterCard with their radical decentraliza-
tion, more than the usual national government (or the usual
20th-century national corporation, like Air France or Krupp or IBM, for
that matter). It is not located in any particular place, though it had
training facilities in Afghanistan. It provides logistical support, financ-
ing, and some leadership to the ad hoc coalitions — coalitions of the
willing, if you like—and it pulls together for operations, often drawing
fighters from local groups that have battled each other for years.
The third unforeseen development was the greater vulnerability
that emerged as a concomitant of the dramatic growth in wealth and
productivity during the last half-century. During World War II, it
required the resources of the wealthiest nations to develop the
weapons that enabled them to destroy the industrial plant of their
adversaries. Perhaps only the United States could have been the first to
produce nuclear weapons. Certainly it would be idle to suppose that a
teenager, sitting in the parlor of a suburban home, could have
destroyed the tank-manufacturing plant run by General Motors. But
today, and increasingly tomorrow, just such a boy or girl will be able
to hack into the computerized supervisory systems that control gas
pipelines, phone networks, electrical grids, and electronic banking, at a
cost to the society of amounts of wealth not dissimilar to the destruc-
tion of an industrial plant by aerial bombing. This new vulnerability
should not be confused with that arising from the spread of WMD. The
atrocities of September 11 were not perpetrated by persons using
sophisticated weapons. Rather, they were made possible because we
had assembled an immense array of talent and capital, and put this
glittering assemblage inside a few large buildings. The vulnerability I
have in mind is a direct consequence of the steps we have taken to link
parts of the economy, to increase productivity by relying on computer-
ization, and to bring persons into efficient proximity.
These three developments are outside the frame of reference of the
popular theories of international relations that circulated at the end of
the 20th century, but they are quite consonant with the decay of the
nation-state (of which they are important drivers) and the emergence
of the market state (which they reflect). Moreover, they have the poten-
tial to interact. Lucrative targets in every postindustrial society will
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soon be vulnerable to anonymous attack, including crude radioactive
or biotoxic assault. It is not hard to imagine the public reaction if, for
example, an ordinary fertilizer bomb were detonated on Wall Street,
spreading nuclear isotopes bought on the black market. Few would be
killed outright, but who would want to work there again? The anthrax
attacks of 2001 shut down postal services and governmental facilities
with just a few letters. It is not inconceivable that hundreds of such let-
ters could be mailed rather than just a handful, with proportionately
greater effect. We have as yet to even identify the author of the original
attacks. But by far the most important consequence of these three
unforeseen developments in the wake of the Long War is their effect
on our understanding. As far as I can tell, it has not been much.
V.
Let us review in some detail the last two years during which we have
energetically and intrepidly fought Al-Qaida and modern terrorism.
This is the timeline of events between September 11, 2001, and Septem-
ber 11, 2003:
September 12, 2001: the North Atlantic Council invokes Article 5 of the
NATO Charter for the first time in 52 years. The Council unanimously
declares the attacks of the preceding day on the United States to be acts
of aggression that trigger the support of all members of the alliance.
September 15: President George W. Bush announces in a nationwide
address that the United States is at war.
October 5: a man dies in the U.S. after contracting a most rare form of
anthrax. The anthrax attacks eventually kill five people and leave sev-
enteen seriously ill. The weapons-grade anthrax was posted in letters
to a number of people and institutions, including U.S. broadcasters
and Senate buildings.
October 7: the U.S. and British forces begin air strikes against targets in
Afghanistan in an attempt to overthrow the Taliban and shut down Al-
Qaida; within two months, they have conquered the country and dri-
ven the Taliban rulers from the capital, Kabul, and their stronghold in
Kandahar.
October 21: it emerges that the CIA is given leave to do whatever is
necessary to destroy Al-Qaida. This is widely interpreted as meaning
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the agency is being allowed to carry out assassinations, 25 years after
President Gerald Ford decreed that: “no person employed by or acting
on behalf of the U.S. Government shall engage in, or conspire to
engage in, assassination.”
October 24: the U.S. Congress approves anti-terrorism legislation that
gives law enforcement agencies sweeping new powers to monitor and
detain suspected terrorists. The bill comes in for heavy criticism from
civil liberties groups. More than 900 people across the U.S. are
detained without charge or trial.
November 16: Mohammed Atef, a key Al-Qaida figure, is killed in U.S.
bombing.
December 14: authorities in Indonesia acknowledge for the first time
the ties between local Islamic groups and Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaida
network. Laskar Jihad, a Muslim militant group, is alleged to have
received help from Al-Qaida members in waging jihad against Chris-
tians in eastern Indonesia, the Moluccan Islands, and central Sulawesi.
U.S. officials discovered in August that Al-Qaida had obtained
detailed plans of the U.S. diplomatic compound in Jakarta.
December 26: Osama bin Laden broadcasts a message over the Al-
Jazeera television network rallying his supporters and denouncing the
U.S. He had apparently escaped.
January 11, 2002: the first prisoners captured on the battlefield in
Afghanistan but believed to be non-Taliban irregulars are transferred
to a prison camp at the American base in Guantanamo, Cuba. The men
are hooded and shackled. Some are sedated. Controversially, the U.S.
classes the detainees as “illegal combatants” rather than as ordinary
prisoners of war.
January 29: President Bush delivers the State of the Union Address. He
announces the second phase of the war on terrorism. He calls North
Korea, Iran, and Iraq part of an “Axis of Evil,” and says the U.S. will
“prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our
friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction.”
January 31: the U.S. sends military personnel to the Philippines and
begins joint military exercises. The U.S. soldiers train Filipino troops to
fight terrorists from Abu Sayyaf, an Islamic extremist group the U.S.
believes to be linked with Al-Qaida.
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February 14: the U.S. sends military advisors to Yemen. They train
troops there to fight terrorists inside its borders.
March 17: the head of the U.S. military Central Command says Al-
Qaida terrorists are operating in Somalia.
April 3: Abu Zubaydah, bin Laden’s chief of operations, is captured; he
tells interrogators that Al-Qaida is capable of creating a dirty bomb
and smuggling it into the U.S.
April 11: a blast at a synagogue on the Tunisian island of Djerba kills
seventeen people — eleven German tourists, five Tunisians, and a
Frenchman. German officials believe the explosion, which was caused
by a fuel truck eruption, was a deliberate attack, while the Tunisian
authorities say it was probably an accident. German ministers report
that there is evidence that Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaida network was
behind the blast.
April 19: the FBI warns that terrorists are planning attacks on banks in
the northeastern U.S. These do not materialize.
May 7: terrorists blow up a tour bus near Karachi, Pakistan. Most of
the injured are French. That same day, U.S. forces attempt an encir-
clement of Al-Qaida holdouts in eastern Afghanistan. On May 30,
however, Pakistan removes its forces along the Afghan border (which
were meant to interdict fleeing Al-Qaida fighters), and redeploys its
units to the Indian border where new tensions have increased.
May 18: the FBI reports that captured Al-Qaida members told them
terrorists may have a plan to rent apartments in the U.S. and load them
with explosives. The FBI also says Al-Qaida may be planning another
large-scale terrorist attack against the U.S. They point to a recent
increase in Al-Qaida communications.
May 19: Vice-President Dick Cheney says it is “almost certain” that Al-
Qaida will carry out another terror attack on America.
May 30: FBI guidelines give agents more latitude to monitor e-mails,
Internet sites, libraries, and religious institutions without first having
evidence of criminal activity. A spokesperson for the American Civil
Liberties Union says: “The FBI is telling the American people that they
no longer have to do anything unlawful to get that knock on the door.”
June 6: President Bush proposes a Cabinet-level Department of Home-
land Security. The Department will restructure many of the govern-
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ment’s departments and agencies in order to focus on “securing the
American homeland and protecting the American people.”
July 1: the U.S. Justice Department proposes Operation TIPS, the Ter-
rorism Information and Prevention System, described on a govern-
ment website as “a nationwide program giving millions of American
truckers, letter carriers, train conductors, ship captains, utility employ-
ees and others a formal way to report suspicious terrorist activity.”
The American Civil Liberties Union voices concern that participants
would, in effect, be searching people’s homes without warrants,
resources would be wasted on useless tips, and vigilantism and racial
profiling would result.
July 3: the FBI warns of attacks on the following day, during U.S. inde-
pendence celebrations. These do not materialize.
September 8: Al-Qaida operatives report that they initially planned to
attack nuclear installations rather than the World Trade Center. Al-
Jazeera says it has interviewed two senior Al-Qaida members who
made the claim, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, allegedly one of bin
Laden’s key lieutenants, and Ramzi Binalshibh.
September 12: President Bush goes to the United Nations and makes
clear that the United States will move against Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein on its own if the U.N. Security Council fails to act. The next
day, Ramzi Binalshibh, one of the Al-Qaida operatives most wanted by
the U.S. government, is arrested.
September 23: the U.S. government issues guidelines on vaccinating
the entire population of the U.S. in 5–7 days in case there is a smallpox
attack.
September 25: the White House issues “The National Security Strategy
of the United States,” a document required by law and sent to Con-
gress. One controversial passage provides, “We must be prepared to
stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to
threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States
and our allies and friends. . . .  To forestall or prevent such hostile acts
by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemp-
tively.”
October 7: President Bush delivers a speech asserting that the U.S.
needs to invade Iraq in order to change the regime in Baghdad.
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October 8: a U.S. marine is killed in Kuwait when two gunmen in a
pick-up truck open fire on a group of marines during training. The
previous week, a bomb in the Philippines killed a Green Beret. Offi-
cials believe both attacks were done by Al-Qaida.
October 10: the U.S. Senate passes a resolution authorizing President
Bush to use whatever means necessary to overthrow Saddam Hussein.
October 12: bombs go off in Bali, Indonesia, in front of a nightclub,
killing more than 180. Officials say these may be terrorist attacks asso-
ciated with Al-Qaida.
November 4: six Al-Qaida members are killed by a Hellfire missile
fired from an unmanned CIA drone at a car believed to be carrying Ali
Qaed Senyan al-Harthi, whom the U.S. had linked to the attack on the
warship USS Cole off Aden in October 2000.
November 28: two attacks are launched against Israeli targets in Mom-
basa, Kenya. A hotel blast kills sixteen, including the three suicide
bombers, and a missile is fired but misses an Israeli plane. A message
on a website purporting to come from Al-Qaida claims the group car-
ried out the attack.
December 12: North Korea announces its plans to resume reprocessing
nuclear fuel in order to make nuclear weapons.
December 14: Jordan says two men arrested in connection with the
killing of U.S. diplomat Laurence Foley are members of Al-Qaida.
January 6, 2003: United Kingdom anti-terror police find the deadly
poison ricin in a London flat. The discovery is followed up with raids
in Manchester, in which a policeman is killed, and in a London
mosque. A number of North Africans are arrested.
February 13: anti-aircraft missile batteries are placed around Washing-
ton and troops are deployed to guard Heathrow airport in London
amid fears of an imminent Al-Qaida attack. The move follows the
broadcast of a taped message purportedly from Osama bin Laden, call-
ing for Muslims to attack U.S. and British targets in retaliation for any
attack on Iraq.
March 1: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, believed to be the key planner of
the September 11 and other Al-Qaida attacks, is arrested. That same
day, Turkey refuses to join the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq.
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April 30: Whalid ba Attash, a senior Al-Qaida official, is arrested along
with five others.
May 12: at least 34 people are killed in a series of bomb attacks in Saudi
Arabia’s capital, Riyadh. The attacks are carried out against luxury
compounds housing foreign nationals and a U.S.-Saudi office. The U.S.
and Saudi governments say Al-Qaida is the prime suspect in the blasts,
which coincided with a visit to the kingdom by U.S. Secretary of State
Colin Powell.
May 16: the Moroccan city of Casablanca is hit by a series of suicide
bomb attacks that kill 41 people, including twelve attackers. The
Moroccan authorities say that the attacks are linked to “international
terror.”
June 6: French officials disclose that two suspected Al-Qaida militants
have been arrested in separate incidents at Charles de Gaulle airport in
Paris. Investigators believe the first man, Karim Mehdi, a Moroccan
national, has links with Al-Qaida militants based in Germany who
planned the attacks on New York and Washington. The second man,
Christian Ganczarski of Germany, is suspected of being involved in
the April 2002 bombing of a synagogue in Djerba, Tunisia, in which 21
people were killed.
June 7: four German peacekeepers are killed and dozens of other peo-
ple injured in an apparent suicide attack on a bus in the Afghan capi-
tal, Kabul. The attack is the deadliest assault on International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) troops since they arrived in the country to bol-
ster the government of President Hamid Karzai after the fall of the Tal-
iban. German Defense Minister Peter Struck blames “Al-Qaida
terrorists.”
June 27: the man suspected of masterminding the series of bombings in
Riyadh is detained in Saudi Arabia. Ali Abdul Rahman al-Ghamdi,
also known as Abu Bakr al-Azdi, was number two on the list of most-
wanted suspects in connection with the 12 May attacks. A U.S. official
described the arrest as a major blow to Al-Qaida’s operations in Saudi
Arabia.
July 15: North Korea announces it has enough fissionable material for
six nuclear weapons.
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August 12: a missile is smuggled from Russia by a British citizen of
Indian descent. An independent arms dealer, he is arrested as he
attempts to sell the weapon to persons he believes to be terrorists. The
arrest occurs in New Jersey.
July 18: amid concern from senior U.K. government figures and criti-
cism from civil rights campaigners, the U.S. agrees to suspend military
court proceedings against Moazzam Begg and Ferroz Abbasi, two
Britons among six Al-Qaida suspects due to face a military tribunal in
the U.S. Along with 680 other detainees, they have been held without
being remanded for criminal prosecutions.
July 30: the U.S. Department of Homeland Security warns that Al-
Qaida terrorists may carry out hijackings or suicide bombings against
U.S. airlines by the end of the summer. These do not materialize.
August 4: Mr. John Ashcroft and the Homeland Security Secretary
Tom Ridge say that anti-terrorism measures introduced since the Sep-
tember 11, 2001 attacks have prevented more than 100 new strikes.
August 14: the operations chief of the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist
group, who collaborated in the Bali bombings, is arrested.
August 19: at 4:45 p.m., a massive truck bomb explodes outside U.N.
headquarters in Baghdad, killing seventeen, including the chief U.N.
envoy to Iraq. A few hours later, a suicide bombing in Jerusalem leaves
at least 20 dead and over 100 wounded, prompting Israel to suspend
all talks with the Palestinian leadership.
August 29: a bombing attack on a Shiite shrine kills at least 125, includ-
ing a leading Shiite cleric who was collaborating with the U.S.-led
coalition. Nineteen men are subsequently arrested, all with admitted
links to Al-Qaida.
What are we to make of these two years?
VI.
I have listed these events — and they are by no means all — to remind
us of the drumbeat of violence in this period, and to emphasize that far
from abating, it is picking up momentum. Since September 11, 2001,
the U.S. has declared war. It has received the unprecedented invoca-
tion of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty by its allies on its behalf.
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Congress has passed various statutes, including the Patriot Act, aimed
at making the prosecution and detection of terrorists easier. The fed-
eral bureaucracy has been reorganized and new funds—funds greater
than the defense budgets of Iran, Iraq, Syria, North Korea, and Libya
combined — have been authorized. U.S.-led coalitions have invaded
and conquered Afghanistan and Iraq in lightning campaigns, and the
U.N. has sanctioned, for the first time, the invasion of a member state
(Afghanistan) in order to suppress terrorism. The first sanctioned tar-
geted assassination by U.S. forces against terrorists has taken place. Off
the Yemeni coast, intelligence vessels collect and collate information
on suspect ships, arms traders, and furtive conversations. The Penta-
gon’s Combined Joint Task Force in the Horn of Africa keeps a fleet of
blacked-out helicopters on permanent standby in Djibouti.7 Much of
the senior leadership of Al-Qaida has been killed or detained, with
fruitful possibilities for interrogation. What remains — the senior fig-
ures of bin Laden and Zawayiri—is in desperate flight.
Yet at the same time, Al-Qaida has continued to strike. In Bali,
Kenya, Pakistan, Tunisia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, and Morocco as
many people have been killed or wounded in terrorist attacks since
September 11 as died on that date. Virtually every week, U.S. soldiers
are killed. The rights of U.S. citizens and those who, while not citizens,
are in the custody of the U.S. are fewer than before. We have seen
countless alerts, color-coded to indicate their threat level, and with
some justice we can conclude that Americans are less safe than before,
perhaps less safe than ever.
It is therefore worthwhile to step back and ask the most basic ques-
tions about winning the war on terrorism. Is there a connection
between the strategies and tactics we are pursuing in the war on terror-
ism and the habitual way we treat warfare — that is, as a conflict
between nation-states? These habits are enshrined in international
institutions like the U.N. and NATO, in military plans that contem-
plate invasion and conquest, and in intelligence operations that are
geared toward renditions and prosecutions. But are these habits
appropriate to the decentralized operations of a mutated market state
like Al-Qaida, which finds lucrative targets in the emerging market
states of the West?
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VII.
Let me very briefly outline how I believe these basic questions should
be addressed. I will organize this inquiry into five parts.
First, we have defined the problem of winning the war against ter-
rorism in a way that makes that problem impossible to solve. The way
we understand “winning” (a victory with an armistice agreement, fol-
lowed by occupation and a peace treaty), “war” (a conflict between
nations over issues of statehood and sovereignty), and “terrorism” (a
criminal act by the disenfranchised or the psychopathic) means that we
simply cannot defeat terrorism. “The War on Terrorism” becomes little
more than a metaphor for propaganda purposes. We can no more win
such a war than we can win a war against disease or disillusionment.
We must reconceptualize each of the key ideas. To begin with, we
are going to have to understand terrorism from the supply side, not
simply the demand side. By that I mean we must change our exclusive
focus on who is the terrorist and what troubles him to what vulnerabil-
ities we have created and how to reduce them. This will become ever
more urgent, regardless of what happens to Al-Qaida, as we enter a
period in which it will be increasingly difficult to determine precisely
who is striking at us and from what remove.
We shall have to abandon the nation-state’s dichotomy of crime and
war, the inner and outer dimensions of state violence, and replace it
with a worldview that admits a free flow between these two dimen-
sions. The members of the Irish Republican Army were criminals who
hungered to be treated as soldiers; the Waffen SS were soldiers who
behaved like criminals and deserved to be treated as such. But the
atrocities committed on September 11, though crimes of historic ugli-
ness, were not committed by mere criminals. These actions were plot-
ted with military precision against military and political targets, by
perpetrators willing to sacrifice themselves for purely political goals.
Victory itself will have to be redefined. Whereas it was once like a
tooth extraction, finally ending pain and promising healing, now vic-
tory will be more like the problem of earning a living: it will start all
over every morning. Not being defeated — carrying on the constitu-
tional life of the society that is under attack — will be the standard of
victory in this war.
Second, we must be clear about what we are fighting for, and what
that fight requires of us, lest the terrorists effectively defeat us through
our own misguided attempts to protect ourselves. This determination
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is not nearly as easy as it is made to look by those civil libertarians who
alarm us by claiming that any diminution of our liberties means that
“the terrorists win” or by those bureaucrats and politicians who sooth-
ingly reassure us that all the necessary measures can be taken without
compromising our civil freedom of action. In every era of the state,
throughout the evolution of its constitutional orders, societies have the
problem of determining the proper relationship between strategy and
law. Outside its territorial domain, the state seeks to be free of external
coercion; this is strategy. Inside its boundaries, the state seeks to
monopolize legitimate violence; this is law. But also within its terri-
tory, what measures are appropriate to prosecute the war outside,
when inside and outside have lost their clear boundaries?
We must explore the changing relationships between the intelli-
gence agencies (as they become more dependent on open sources) and
the media (as they become more powerful purveyors of secrets);
between the political parties who seem to have shunned the traditional
bipartisanship of governance during war in favor of more party con-
flict; and between unions and their constituent parts (such as the
United States, where intelligence is not shared with the states of the
union, and the European Union, where it is not shared with the central
union owing to national distrust and self-serving states). We will have
to learn how to find and work with private sector collaborators, partly
because they own most of the critical infrastructure that we must make
less vulnerable and partly because they are market oriented and
global, thus bridging some of the gaps between the nation-state and
our Al-Qaida adversaries. We must rethink ideas like “Homeland
Security” when the threats to our security cannot be neatly cabined as
in or out of the homeland, just as we must revisit the issue of CIA-FBI
cooperation, because these two agencies are so completely defined by
the Long War and its basis in the territorial nation-state.8
It is a common assumption that the rights of individuals and the
powers of government exist along a spectrum, or along a gauge whose
needle indicates the precise division at any moment between rights
and powers. The more tranquil the period, the more we can expect the
needle to shift toward the people and away from the state; the greater
the emergency, the likelier that the needle will veer toward increased
centralized power. And there is something to this. To take another
image, rights and powers are like the shoreline and the sea, constantly
shifting but generally staying within high and low tides, the move-
ment of one line matching exactly the retreat or advance of the other.
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But this two-dimensional way of looking at things does not exhaust
matters because it omits the role of alternative but possible worlds. We
must not only measure our loss of liberty against that which we once
enjoyed, because things are changing dramatically and threats to us
are growing. Rather, the appropriate measure is against those liberties
we would enjoy had we not taken action, or had taken other action. A
state that fails to protect its people’s security in order to keep their lib-
erties intact will end up with neither security nor liberty.
We must also measure our tactical and strategic policies against the
impact such policies are likely to have on our future constitutional
development. If we abandon the Executive Order against assassina-
tions, what is the cost to our legitimacy as a state before our people?
This is not a matter of civil liberties but rather self-respect. If we
engage in torture, perhaps by turning over prisoners to less squeamish
intelligence services, are we substantiating the charges made against
us by those who say that we are the true rogue state, and that state ter-
ror is every much a threat to mankind as the terrorism of Al-Qaida? If
we ally ourselves with undemocratic autocracies who share our fear of
Al-Qaida but perhaps with whom we have little else in common, are
we simply borrowing against a future in which those peoples that we
have helped suppress rise up and blame us — much as we are blamed
for collaborating with dictators in the Third World to fight commu-
nism (though we are seldom blamed for the equally awful collabora-
tion with communism to defeat fascism)? If it is true that full and fair
elections in a dozen Islamic states would bring bin Laden to power,
does this make us hypocrites to claim that the sovereignty of other
states, like Iraq, is forfeited owing to its undemocratic practices? Or
does it mean that our commitment to democracy itself must be
rethought?
Third, the United States must play a leading role in winning the war
against terrorism, but that war can only be won with the collaboration
of many states. The risks of leadership are two-fold: if the U.S. is out in
front, it becomes the target for every terrorist group that simply wants
a free hand for its predations, while at the same time, the U.S. becomes
the focal point of charges by other states that it is seeking an empire.
Some of those who make the latter claim believe simply that over-
whelming power necessarily leads to empire, indeed is the very defini-
tion of empire.
The United States is very powerful economically and militarily. We
have the world’s largest economy, greater than that of all the other
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members of the G-7 combined, and we are growing at a faster rate. We
are the only state that can settle its debts in its own currency. Militarily,
we are the only remaining superpower, owing to the collapse of the
Soviet Union and our continued $100 billion-plus defense budgets. Yet
we should not be misled by these figures. Like the much-cited increase
in the gap between high and low income earners, these statistics con-
ceal an equally important truth — the development gap between high
and low is closing. This means that while the U.S. has a vastly larger
army, equipped with infinitely superior weaponry and communica-
tions, the harm that can be done to the U.S. is increasing more quickly
(as technology disperses and becomes cheaper) than our lead is grow-
ing. In other words, poor states — and poor terrorist groups — who
could not begin to mount a challenge by invading across a contested
plain, can hope to do enough damage to dissuade the U.S. or any other
powerful state from attempting to coerce them. This was the impor-
tant, but often missed, argument about deterrence with respect to Iraq.
It wasn’t that the U.S. couldn’t deter Saddam Hussein if he got nuclear
weapons; surely there was no chance of an unprovoked Iraqi attack on
the U.S. because that would trigger certain retaliatory annihilation.
Rather, it was that, with a very few nuclear weapons, Saddam Hussein
would have a free hand in the Gulf because the United States could
scarcely afford to put half a million troops within the scope of such
weapons in order to dislodge an Iraqi aggression. This paradox — the
increasingly greater power and increasingly greater vulnerability of
the U.S. — means that the United States is the indispensable leader of
the war on terrorism. It alone has the resources as well as the interest
in being such a leader because it is also very vulnerable.
Yet American leadership actually tempts disarray and non-coopera-
tion. The former French foreign minister, Hubert Vedrine, spoke for
many when he said, “We cannot accept a politically unipolar world.”9
For those of us who remember the bipolar world from which we have
only recently emerged, such statements are especially galling but they
are, I fear, an accurate reflection of opinion abroad. With respect to ter-
rorism, such attitudes exploit the solipsism so characteristic of the
nation-state. It will always be possible for states to sacrifice other states
to terrorists on the theory that not only does it buy them protection but
it also weakens their competitors. It is, I am afraid, actually true that
when the current French foreign minister, Dominique de Villepin, was
asked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies which side he
wanted to see win in Iraq, he simply declined to answer after a long
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and amused pause. Indeed, there are many who see the war on terror-
ism as a kind of stalking-horse for an American empire. One think tank
has thoughtfully provided a list. The Americans are prosecuting this
war so they can:
• Instigate a ‘clash of civilizations’ that will provide the U.S. with an
excuse to reorganize the world under the tutelage of an American
empire.
• Secure control of the oil and gas rich lands of Central Asia and the
Middle East.
• Undermine the political and economic development and integration
of the Eurasian landmass.
• Maintain economic power during the course of the current financial
crisis by using U.S. taxpayer money (and lives) to force on the world
that which a truly free market would not have otherwise allowed—
unchallenged American economic and political supremacy.10
One must shudder at the consequences for the world (to say nothing of
the war on terrorism) of such attitudes for they invite an anti-Ameri-
can multipolarity with which the worst and most retrograde forces can
combine.
If neither unipolarity nor multipolarity is acceptable, what about
multilateralism? Should the war against terrorism be prosecuted
under the auspices of a multinational organization such as the United
Nations, or perhaps NATO or the E.U.? Or should what have come to
be called “coalitions of the willing” become an acceptable means of
fighting this war? And finally, what constitutional and strategic mod-
els can we look to for the reconstitution of societies that have been rav-
aged by conflict and have sheltered terrorists? It may be that we can
revive the otherwise outmoded provisions of the U.N. Charter and cre-
ate U.N. trusteeships for failed states like Afghanistan or postwar Iraq.
Or it may be that we will need new models that are less territorial and
exclusive, such as free trade zones with both the U.S. and the E.U. for
areas like Palestine, Kashmir, the Koreas, and Iraq.
Fourth, we must develop legal and strategic parameters for state
action. We might start with a definition of what constitutes terrorism. I
suggest that terrorism is the use of violence to prevent persons from
doing what they would otherwise lawfully do, when undertaken for
political goals and without regard to the protection of noncombatants.
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Beginning with such a definition, we can then work out what a state is
permitted to do in its search for terrorists.
For example, we might then be able to address the new U.S.
National Security Strategy and its call for preemption in light of the
obvious conflict with Article 2 (4) of the U.N. Charter. If it is unlawful
for a state to use force in the absence of an actual or imminent attack or
authorization by the U.N. Security Council, is it not also unlawful, in
the absence of such a resolution, for one state to preempt another’s
war-making capabilities before these are ever put to use? Yet in this era
of disguised attack, isn’t such preemption an absolute necessity where
WMD are concerned? Once a state acquires nuclear weapons, a
moment that U.N. or U.S. monitoring seems incapable of predicting
with precision, it is too late to put the genie back in the bottle. What is
the chief reason that Saddam Hussein is not in power while Kim Jong-
Il remains? It is because the latter got to the nuclear finish line before
he was preempted (despite, it should be noted, U.N. inspections for
the preceding nine years).
Nor should a search for such parameters exclude the consideration
of the so-called “root” causes of terrorism. I, for one, do not believe
that the developed world should seek to aid the peoples of the less
developed states — to improve their health and longevity, their per
capita income and education, their human rights and political liberties
— on the grounds that this will reduce the threat of terrorism. The tie
between such causes and effects is too tenuous. And, as suggested
above, my “supply-side” approach to terrorism better fits the global,
anonymous networks we shall have to face in the 21st century than the
“demand-side” approaches that were relevant to the national libera-
tion movements of the 20th century. But the search for root causes does
raise one important issue with far-reaching relevance for the legiti-
macy of the war on terrorism. That is the question of state terrorism. If
the assassinations and torture by the Israeli state are countenanced,
indeed financed, by the United States, then aren’t we subject to the
same accusations of terrorism as we would hurl at any other state that
employed such methods? Or are these tactics the only effective means
of protecting a society at war with those who can easily infiltrate it,
and thus prefigure the tactics we will ourselves be forced to adopt.
And if we do adopt these methods, are they more like the strategic
bombing of World War II, which relied on an in terrorem effect to
achieve its military goals (as at Hiroshima and Nagasaki) or more like
the bombing of civilian populations that we would now condemn as
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war crimes (like the blitz against London or the Allied bombing of
Dresden)?
Finally, we must develop new rules of international law that incor-
porate these parameters and determine when it is permissible for one
state to intervene in another’s affairs in order to protect itself or it allies
from terrorism. Obviously, we need to amend the Geneva Conven-
tions to deal with the question posed at Guantanamo: what treatment
is to be accorded prisoners in the war on terrorism? They are not com-
batants in uniform with a publicly acknowledged chain of command.
But they are not spies or partisans either. As soldiers, even if unlawful
ones, who are captured on the field of battle, they can be held in pris-
ons until the end of the conflict without trial or arraignment. But does
this make sense when there is no nation-state to agree to end the con-
flict or to make arrangements for prisoner exchanges — when, that is,
these prisoners may be held in perpetuity?
Equally obviously, we must confront in international law the chang-
ing face of sovereignty. Roughly speaking, there are three contending
views of sovereignty at present. One, which I call “opaque” sover-
eignty, holds that the acts of a state within its own jurisdiction (possi-
bly with the qualification of jus cogens) are matters of the state’s own
judgment and cannot be the basis for any penetration of the state’s sov-
ereignty. What China does in Tibet is its own affair, no matter what the
Dalai Lama or Richard Gere may say. Indeed, what China does in Tai-
wan, in Beijing’s view, may also be cloaked with such opacity. A sec-
ond view, which I call “translucent” sovereignty, holds that a state’s
acts can be the subject of intervention when they are judged by a com-
petent international body to have disqualified the state’s right to inde-
pendence. This was the basis for the intervention in Afghanistan,
which was authorized by the U.N. Security Council. A third view,
which may be called “transparent” sovereignty, is more radical. It
holds that because sovereignty arises from the people and cannot be
wholly delegated to the state, a government forfeits its sovereignty
when it makes war on its own people (through campaigns of ethnic
cleansing, for example) or when it systematically denies them human
rights of a broad scale. These three views can come into conflict when
one state seeks the help of another in capturing and extraditing terror-
ists, confiscating terrorist funds, interdicting terrorist transit, or shar-
ing intelligence. They are, therefore, fraught with the potential for
conflict. Developing a consensus on this issue ought to be given the
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highest priority in international law. As Sir Michael Howard wisely
put it:
[W]e need to know rather more about the new structure of international
legitimacy towards which we are striving before we abandon the old. An
explicit American hegemony may appear preferable to the messy com-
promises of the existing order, but if it is nakedly based on commercial
interests and military power it will lose all legitimacy. Terror will con-
tinue and, worse, widespread sympathy with terror. But American
power placed at the service of an international community legitimized
by representative institutions and the rule of law, accepting its con-
straints and inadequacies but continually working to improve them: that
is a very different matter. It is by doing this that the US has earned admi-
ration, respect, and indeed affection throughout the world over the past
half century. But if that relationship is to continue, and respect is to over-
come hate, the US must cease to think of itself as a heroic lone protago-
nist in a cosmic war against ‘evil,’ and reconcile itself to a less
spectacular and more humdrum role: that of the leading participant in a
flawed but still indispensable system of co-operative global gover-
nance.11
Fifth, we must confront the possibility that we will not win the war
on terrorism because we, along with the rest of the international com-
munity, are unable to transform our ideas. That is, we must consider
the question: if winning the war against terrorism is simply not losing,
what constitutes losing? I submit that we will have lost if the United
States loses it strategic hegemony and its legal legitimacy as the fore-
most leader of the West. This could happen in three different contexts:
(1) The U.S. might lose the war within the United States itself if it
was forced to resort to martial law for an extended period. Nothing is
more urgent than for the Congress to stockpile laws as assiduously as
the Pentagon is stockpiling vaccines. For example, I am serving on a
commission on the “continuity of government” — a euphemism for
what to do if mass deaths of senior officials occur. One element of this
has to do with the reconstitution of the House of Representatives if it is
successfully attacked. The U.S. Constitution provides that the House
must have a quorum of half its members in order to conduct business.
If a member of the House dies, he or she can only be replaced by an
election (in contrast to the Senate, which can be temporarily reconsti-
tuted by gubernatorial appointment). That means that if half of the
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House members were killed or incapacitated, the United States could-
n’t even declare war on the state that attacked it. If this seems far-
fetched, then recall the fact that the fourth hijacked plane of September
11 was, we now believe, headed for the Capitol before it was comman-
deered by incredibly courageous passengers. Had it reached the terror-
ists’ intended destination, it would have arrived just after a roll call
vote in the House of Representatives, with incalculable consequences.
Nevertheless, for perhaps the same reasons that people hesitate to
make out a will, the Congress has been unwilling to address this issue.
The excuse given is that the House wishes to preserve its role as an
elected body. How idle this sounds when we realize that the alterna-
tive to correcting this problem is not a rump Congress but martial law,
the very opposite of representative government.
(2) The war could be said to be lost if we were compelled to revert to
multipolarity in the strategic environment. In some capitals, perhaps
Paris, to take a random example, the wish for multipolarity is linked to
the daydream of a European empire rich and influential enough to
pose alternatives to the world community that, whatever the content,
are not American. In the strategic environment, this means a competi-
tion for adherents in other parts of the globe, as the French sought
when they lined up opposition to the U.S.-U.K. resolutions about Iraq
in the U.N. Security Council. It means an enormous expenditure of
wealth on the technology of the 21st century that ought to be deployed
for the common defense of the West. With respect to terrorism, it
means a divided alliance in which terrorists can negotiate safe passage
and clandestine arms in exchange for becoming the clients of the great
opposing poles. It means, finally, a return to the era when giant behe-
moths confronted each other with lethal weapons.
(3) Or the war on terrorism could be lost if, in the chaos of failed
nation-states or the fog of virtual market states, the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction reached a critical point beyond which
they could not be re-cabined. This has happened, one fears, with
respect to handguns in the United States. There is no reason it could
not happen with respect to biotoxins or nuclear isotopes in the world
at large.
My own view is that much important work remains to be done on
the question of losing the war on terrorism. I particularly think that the
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use of global scenarios — a technique pioneered by Royal Dutch Shell
and eloquently recommended by Joseph Nye when he was head of the
National Intelligence Council—is an appropriate but at present under-
utilized means of anticipating such failures and coping with, or even
preventing, them.
VIII.
Our current ways of understanding terrorism render the problem
practically insoluble. The United States still tends to separate strategy
and law so that the strategists are either ignoring the need for new
international laws or busily ripping up the domestic ones, while the
lawyers are denouncing the strategic effort as an excuse for creating a
more intrusive and aggressive state. To make matters worse, both the
United States and the other Great Powers insist on importing into the
emerging world of market states the understandings that were suc-
cessful in the old world of nation-states.
Osama bin Laden may have risen to prominence in the nation-state
conflict in Afghanistan between communism and parliamentarianism,
but Al-Qaida, despite its occasional flickers of interest in nation-state
conflicts, is something quite different. Until we recognize this differ-
ence, we will have difficulty not only in stopping the terrorist cam-
paign, but also in rallying domestic and international support for our
efforts.
My arguments go back to a fundamental analysis of the relation-
ships between strategy and law and between history and legitimacy. I
close with the increasingly urgent exhortation that the United States
undertake the organization of coalitions to defeat terrorism and inter-
vene in humanitarian crises, articulating a collective vision of the
future that its allies can support and have a hand in creating — before
it’s too late. 
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